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Contributory Negligence of Children
James H. Keet, Jr. *
W E WILL DEAL PRIMARILY with the child of tender years and
will touch only briefly on the teen-ager in the field of
contributory negligence. We will first examine the characteristics
of younger children which the courts have emphasized in ap-
plying the doctrine of contributory negligence and then review
the rationale underlying the way in which the courts have ap-
plied the doctrine to the child. We will find that the "capacity"
of a child to be contributorily negligent has presented problems
which are related to the standard of care which the child, if
capable of contributory negligence, must observe in order not to
be barred by this defense.
Analysis by the Courts
The American Judge has joined with Lewis Carroll and
Mark Twain in expounding many ideas on what, in addition to
puppy dog tales, are the elements and ingredients of a young
child. The subject is challenging and extremely important in
the field of contributory negligence law.
The courts have sketched in character lines revealing the
elements of young children. Prudence is notably absent. Impul-
siveness predominates. As one judge has observed, "A prudent
4 year old boy would be an unattractive anomaly." ' The child
is "expected to act upon childish instincts and impulses." 2 The
judge expects to find "impulsiveness, indiscretion, and disregard
of danger." 3 The child is looked upon as incapable of choosing
between the right and the wrong, between care and recklessness,
since he is a "creature of impulse and impetuosity," with "no
habits of deliberation and forethought," and with no regard for
warnings.4
* A.B., Princeton Univ.; LL.B., Harvard Univ.; Member of the law firm of
Lincoln, Haseltine, Keet, Forehand and Springer, of Springfield, Missouri;
etc.
1 Le Febvre v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 176, 178 (D. C., D. Md. 1959).
2 Bagdad Land and Lumber Co. v. Boyette, 104 Fla. 699, 140 So. 798, 800
(1932).
3 Burger v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 112 Mo. 238, 249, 20 S. W. 439, 441 (1892).
4 Von Saxe v. Barnett, 125 Wash. 639, 217 P. 62, 64 (1923). See also Govern-
ment Street Ry. Co. v. Hanlon, 53 Ala. 70 (1875).
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The bench views the child as necessarily lacking in the
knowledge of physical cause and effect relationships which is
usually acquired only through experience.5 While a child may
have all of the knowledge of an adult relative to a danger which
will attend a particular act, he is not regarded as necessarily
having the prudence, thoughtfulness and discretion of an adult
to avoid the danger.6 It takes a stronger indication of danger to
alert a child." He does not have as much capacity for weighing
and relating the factors in a given situation and realizing that
there is a substantial likelihood that his conduct will bring these
factors into combined and cooperating effect to his injury."
Jurists have toyed with the interesting question of whether
modern children are smarter and better able to appreciate the
danger and risk in a given situation. In Hellstern v. Smelowitz,9
the court, noting that there was once a time when "the age of
discretion of an infant was determined to begin when the infant
was able to count up to 12 pence and to measure an ell of cloth.
Y. B. 12 and 13 Edw. III, R. S. 236 (1339)," opined that "the
ripening of the mental faculties of children in general must, we
think, have been accelerated by the progressive enlargement of
a child's scope of observations and experiences in our modern
environment." This same thought is expressed in Eckhardt v.
Hanson,'0 to the effect that modem children of tender years have
more opportunities to observe and be aware of danger because of
the influence exercised upon them by moving pictures, radio and
other modern inventions and conditions.
Perhaps child psychologists would violently disagree. A
child of frontier days, continually required to care for himself
and cope with many dangers which the modem child is not ex-
5 Bagdad Land and Lumber Co. v. Boyette, supra note 2.
6 Burger v. Missouri Pac. Ry., supra note 3.
7 City of Jacksonville v. Stokes, 74 So. 2d 278, 279 (Fla. 1954).
8 Novicki v. Blaw-Knox Co., 304 F. 2d 931, 933 (3rd Cir. 1962), a good ex-
ample of the typical naive mental processes where the child, although
knowing full well that a hand caught between the gears would be injured,
testified "we were not planning to stick our hand in the machine" and,
when asked, "You knew that if you put your finger in between the gears
you'd get hurt, didn't you?" answered, "Yes. But we weren't thinking
about getting hurt or nothing." Compare Vitale v. Smith Auto Sales Co.,
101 Vt. 477, 144 A. 380 (1929). A 9 year old boy, allegedly a "congenital
imbecile," who was held not "so lacking in mentality that he was incapable
of exercising some degree of care for his own safety."
9 17 N. J. Super. 366, 86 A. 2d 265, 270-271 (1952).
10 196 Minn. 270, 264 N. W. 776 (1936).
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posed to, might well have been a much keener and more circum-
spect individual. The modern child who, while he is exposed to
the dangers of the automobile and other modem mechanical de-
vices, does not have the experiences which would tend to sharpen
his instincts and senses and capacity for realization of risk and
danger."
It may be that jurists, at least in automobile cases, initially
reasoned that the automobile was of such comparative newness
that it was too much to expect children to appreciate the danger
and avoid it. As we have progressed into the automobile age, the
judge may have subconsciously come to consider this fact as one
of the expected parts of a child's existence which has acclimated
the child to the danger of the automobile.
It is difficult to believe that child psychology has, merely by
reason of certain mechanical progress in our civilization, been
essentially changed. While in some ways he may well realize that
certain things such as the automobile hold a great deal of
danger, he is still nevertheless a creature of impulse who does
not consider the possible danger of a combination of factors which
to the more experienced adult mind would present a very present
danger. He is still going to "follow a bait as mechanically as a
fish." 12
The Rationale of Judicial Leniency
The status of children of tender years has from time im-
memorial been recognized in law to be different from that of one
of more mature years.13 It has been easy, therefore, for the judge
to feel justified in giving the plaintiff child the benefit of his
11 Note the opposing view of McAllister, J., in Tyler v. Weed, 285 Mich.
460, 280 N. W. 827, 837 (1938):
But in our opinion, it cannot be said in view of distinguished authorities
who hold contrary views that this is a matter of which a court can take
judicial notice. Such statements are not generally accepted. One can-
not say arbitrarily that the mental growth, intelligence, awareness,
capability, and judgment of a modern child under seven years of age,
are more developed because of such external stimuli. It is not agreed
that the development of the child mentality depends upon such con-
siderations."
Also to this effect is Verni v. Johnson, 295 N. Y. 436, 68 N. E. 2d 431, 432
(1946) in which the court, referring to the rule of conclusive presumption
of incapacity in children between three and four, stated:
It is not an unjust rule or one which changing conditions make obsolete.
No reason appears for changing it.
12 United Zinc and Chemical Co. v. Britt, 258 U. S. 268, 66 L. Ed. 615, 617
(1922).
13 McDonald v. City of Spring Valley, 285 Ill. 52, 120 N. E. 476 (1918).
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comparative lack of capacity for taking care of himself, especially
when we consider that the courts have tended to water down the
defense of contributory negligence. 1 4 There is a tendency to
adopt a "double standard" as between the negligence of the de-
fendant (the objective standard) and the subjective standard
(which ordinarily would favor the plaintiff) in adult plaintiff
cases,15 thus it is all the more understandable that the courts
would relax the defense of contributory negligence in favor of
the child plaintiff.
It has been urged that individuals should not be considered
at legal fault for failing to live up to a standard which as a prac-
tical matter they cannot meet.'6 This reasoning explains in part
the leniency of the courts in continuing to place the child plain-
tiff in a more favorable climate in the field of contributory neg-
ligence. 17
The child is under certain disabilities which should be taken
into account in determining whether he should be deprived of
his cause of action where his conduct, while not meeting the
standard of care required by adults, nevertheless meets a
standard of "childish care." This is the most that can be asked
of the child as a matter of fairness and ethics.' 8
While it has been reasoned that human sympathy is not the
basis for the special rules applicable to children in this area,' 9
courts are, after all, human beings with a tendency to express
fondness toward children.20
The rules in favor of children have been justified on the
basis that since the child is lacking in judgment and discretion,21
14 James and Dickenson, Accident Proneness and Accident Law, 63 Harv. L.
Rev. 769 (1950).
15 James, The Qualities of the Reasonable Man in Negligence Cases, 16 Mo.
L. Rev. 1, 2 (1951), which points out that the "double standard" is probably
an effective psychological force with juries even where it is not, as such,
submitted to the jury in instructions, since juries will tend to resolve
doubts on both issues (negligence and contributory negligence) in favor of
plaintiffs, whether they be children or adults.
16 Ibid.
17 Charbonneau v. MacRury, 84 N. H. 501, 153 A. 457 (1931).
18 Annot., 77 A. L. R. 2d 917 (1961).
19 Annot., 174 A. L. R. 1080 (1948).
20 Deming v. City of Chicago, 321 Ill. 341, 151 N. E. 886 (1926); the very
name "child" evokes thoughts of sympathy and feeling for this being of
comparative incapacity, to the extent that it has even been questioned
whether it is error for the trial court to refer to the plaintiff as a "child."
21 Cox v. Hugo, 52 Wash. 2d 815, 329 P. 2d 467 (1958).
Sept., 1963
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the doctrine of contributory negligence should not apply to
children except where they are of sufficient "knowledge, ex-
perience, intelligence, judgment, and discretion to be capable
to some extent of deliberating and acting upon its own experience
and judgment." 22 A contrary approach would often free the de-
fendant from liability in situations where he should have fore-
seen that his act or omissions might result in harm to children
and it would be improper to permit him to bring harm to a child
and not be answerable in damages.23
Courts which have allowed the jury to consider the mental
shortcomings of the subnormal adult have no doubt found it easy
to apply the same standard to children. In each category, the
plaintiff is incapable, because of mental incapacity, to look out
for himself as well as a competent adult.
24
Analysis by the Jury
The nature, capacity, and duty of the child have been con-
sidered questions of fact peculiarly within the province of the
jury. The jury's "knowledge of human nature generally and of
children in particular" is felt to make the jury a proper forum for
the determination of these facts.25 It has been stated that the
determination of the degree of care which may be expected in
children is based on factors which the jury can weigh "in the
light of their experience at least as well as judges" and that it
does not require any "special training or learning which judges
are supposed to possess in higher degree." 26
22 Von Saxe v. Barnett, supra note 4, 217 P. 62, 64.
23 Jackson v. Jones, 224 La. 403, 69 So. 2d 729, 733 (1953), in which the
court, applying a conclusive presumption of incapacity, as to a boy age
seven injured on a pile of lumber, stated:
To hold otherwise would effectually abolish the duty of care placed
upon the contractor in this case-that is, that he should have foreseen
that the children of the school would be attracted to and would go
upon the unguarded lumber which was inherently dangerous to them.
24 James, op. cit. supra note 16 (and cases cited in footnotes 132 and 133):
Wiles v. Motor Club of America, 67 Ohio L. Abs. 397, 121 N. E. 2d 167
(Ohio Com. P1. 1953);
Noel v. McCaig, 174 Kan. 677, 258 P. 2d 234 (1953);
Emory University v. Lee, 97 Ga. App. 680, 104 S. E. 2d 234 (1958).
Although mere adult "dullness of mind" has been held not a good reason
to apply a relaxed standard to him (Worthington v. Mencer, 96 Ala. 310, 11
So. 72 (1892)) the courts have generally ruled that an adult mental in-
competent will not be held to the same standard of care as a competent
adult.
25 Greene v. DiFazio, 148 Conn. 419, 171 A. 2d 411, 414 (1961).
26 Camardo v. N. Y. State Rys., 247 N. Y. 111, 159 N. E. 879, 881 (1928).
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The jury has been equated with the "common experience of
the public" and, therefore, is eminently qualified to decide fact
questions where it is urged that the child plaintiff failed to
observe a certain standard of conduct.2 7
While the courts have generally viewed the jury as qualified
to decide the fact questions involving the alleged contributory
negligence of children, there has not been a tendency to entrust
to the jury the testimony of expert witnesses on child psycho-
logy.28 This is apparently founded in a belief of the courts that
such testimony would tend to confuse and unduly occupy the
jury without proportionate benefit. 29 Testimony from expert
child psychologists as to proven physical characteristics should
not be unduly confusing or time-consuming and should, on the
basis of fairness to the party wishing to utilize it, be admissible.
Compare the approach in Tyler vs. Weed,3 0 in which the court
urges that protection of the child "should not in these days
be frittered away by the hazards of metaphysical reflection,
or the necessarily dubious speculation of juries in such cases."
While Judge McAllister recognized that in his state (Minnesota)
the reading of scientific works to the jury was not permissible,
he concluded that this should not preclude the appellate court
from using scientific works and books in determining that chil-
dren under the age of seven years are conclusively presumed in-
capable of contributory negligence.
The jury alone without expert testimony is at least qualified
to decide what should be done in certain fact situations which
involve characteristics of children bearing on the questions of
whether there was capacity for contributory negligence and
whether the child observed the required standard of care. The
courts have tended to entrust these matters to the juryman in-
stead of deciding them as a matter of law.3 1
27 McCain v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 110 So. 2d 718, 722 (Fla. 1959).
28 Annot., 77 A. L. R. 2d 917 (footnote 13) (1961) where it is stated "appar-
ently there has been little attempt to investigate the question on a factual
basis by resorting to studies of child development by psychologists or edu-
cators" in referring to the question of capacity.
29 Compare, James and Dickenson, op. cit. supra, note 15 at 784.
30 Supra note 11 at 838.
31 Annot., 77 A. L. R. 2d 917, 932 (1961).
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The Capacity Conundrum-In General
As we have noted above, children have a favored status
relative to contributory negligence because they have less ca-
pacity (and sometimes no capacity) for appreciating and avoid-
ing danger. It is, therefore, unfair to hold them to the same
standard of care as an adult. We must determine, therefore,
what factors make a child less capable than the adult.
It is necessary in each case to determine whether the partic-
ular child, at the time of the occurrence, had such knowledge,
experience, judgment and other similar characteristics, that he
should be held to some duty of care. Since children vary widely
within the same age group, it is necessary to consider factors
other than age. While some indication as to the judgment, dis-
cretion, and intelligence of the particular child, age does not
alone answer the question. As stated in Sorrentino v. McNeill,3 2
"the civil irresponsibility of a young child is not regarded as an
invariable concomitant of a certain age-except it be little, if any,
beyond swaddling clothes-to be arbitrarily fixed upon such age
alone, but is to be determined as existing or not, from all the
applicable circumstances, like any other question of fact." His
discretion to heed and his power of self-control constitute the
predominate element.33
The question becomes one of whether the particular child
is "able" to act "unreasonably" under the circumstances, in light
of his age, training, judgment and other relevant factors which
apply to him. In Bush v. New Jersey and New York Transit
Co. 3 4 it is stated that trial practicality requires that courts desig-
nate the age at which the trial court should allow the jury to
determine the question of capacity, "absent any special attribute
possessed by the child" and that most courts have drawn the
line at some point for purposes of certainty and trial expe-
diency. 5
32 122 S. W. 2d 723, 725 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
33 Lederer v. Connecticut Co., 95 Conn. 520, 111 AUt. 785 (1920); Grenier v.
Town of Glastonbury, 118 Conn. 477, 173 A. 160 (1934); and other cases
collected in Annot., 107 A. L. R. 1, 44, et seq. (1937).
34 30 N. J. 345, 153 A. 2d 28, 33 (1959).
35 The line is not easily drawn and "there is a wide diversity of judicial
opinion as to a definite or fixed age that is sufficient to constitute a child
sui juris, so as to charge it with contributory negligence." Walston v.
Greene, 247 N. C. 693, 102 S. E. 2d 124, 126 (1958). Ruling that evidence
of the child's attending Sunday school and church, enrollment in kinder-
(Continued on next page)
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Even though the child is aware of the danger and an adult
would be barred by contributory negligence in not avoiding such
danger, the child may not have the required prudence, thought-
fulness and discretion to avoid the danger. He must also "ap-
preciate" the danger in the sense of understanding the implica-
tions of the danger.3 6
The question is not whether the child is capable of just any
negligence but whether he was capable of appreciating the par-
ticular danger with which he was confronted at the time of his
injury.3 7
Relative to realizing the risk involved, it has been stated
that the child must realize that his conduct will bring certain
factors, of which he well may have knowledge, into combined
and cooperating effect to his injury.3 8 This same line of reason-
ing is found in Hoilman vs. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.,39 where
the court reasoned that the plaintiff, age nine, may have known
the danger of being on a railroad track when an engine passed,
but may have lacked the discretion to appreciate the imprudence
of attempting to cross the track under the circumstances. The
court ruled that the mere fact that he was familiar with the
railroad crossing was not sufficient to overcome the presumption
of "want of discretion" which his age implied.
One of the most important factors to be considered on the
question of capacity is the nature of the danger to which the
child is exposed. As noted in Birmingham and A. R. Co. v. Mat.
tison,4 0 some children at the age of seven will better understand
(Continued from preceding page)
garten, and certain other attributes were considered not sufficient to "dis-
tinguish this child from the average child of his age" and therefore the
presumption had not been overcome, the court noted additional factors
which would be relevant such as attending school, being taught safety
regulations, experience in caring for himself in traffic, and any other evi-
dence of his physical and mental capabilities. The court indicated that
the factors in Dillman v. Mitchell, 13 N. J. 412, 99 A. 2d 809 (1953) (in
which there was evidence that the child attended kindergarten and went
to school and to the store by himself and had crossed the highway many
times and had been told to watch traffic and understood that he must be
careful) would improve the defendant's case.
sO Annot., 77 A. L. R. 2d 917, 928 (1961); U. S. v. Stoppelmann, 266 F. 2d
13 (8th Cir. 1959); Novicki v. Blaw-Knox Co., supra note 8; Hines v.
Milosivich, 68 Cal. Rep. 2d 520, 157 P. 2d 45 (1945).
37 Annot., 174 A. L. R. 1080, 1134, 1135 (1948).
38 See Novicki v. Blaw-Knox Co., supra note 8.
39 201 S. C. 308, 22 S. E. 2d 892 (1942).
40 166 Ala. 602, 52 So. 49 (1909).
Sept., 1963
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol12/iss3/2
CHILD'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
the dangers of trains and automobiles than others will at the age
of fourteen.4 1
There is no clear-cut statement in the cases as to whether
the jury is to determine the question of capacity on the same
basis as it determines the question of whether the child has lived
up to the required standard of care. Nor is there any definitive
rule which in effect says that the jury, if it finds the child capable
of contributory negligence, must find that the child failed to ob-
serve the standard of care required of it.
42
Capacity Presumptions
Most courts have recognized that children three years of
age or under cannot be guilty of contributory negligence, i.e.,
the courts in such cases apply a conclusive presumption of in-
capacity. As to ages from four up to thirteen, the courts have
adopted various approaches. Some, using the so-called "Illinois
Rule," have applied the conclusive presumption to children be-
yond six years, thus extending the common law rule which gave
children the benefit of such presumption until they reached age
seven, by analogy to the criminal law principle that children
under seven were not "capable" of crime. Others have applied
the "Massachusetts Rule" that in this age bracket there should
be a rebuttable presumption of incapacity, which, however, can
be overcome by production of substantial evidence to show capac-
ity. The courts have differed as to the effect of the rebuttable
presumption. Some hold that where defendant produces sufficient
evidence, the presumption disappears and will not be considered
41 The court reasoned that a child raised in the city may be perfectly
capable of understanding and avoiding the danger of streetcars, railroads
and crowded streets, but insensible to the danger of farm machinery and
equipment such as a foot adz or a scythe blade. By the same token, a child
raised on a farm would be familiar with and much more sensible to the
danger of farm machinery than to the danger of crowded streets in a city.
See also: Boyer v. Northern Pac. Coal Co., 27 Wash. 707, 68 P. 348 (1902),
which recognizes the importance of experience with dangerous appliances
in a case of a boy of fourteen of average intelligence, in which the court
discounted the factor of age when compared with natural intelligence and
past experience; Kehler v. Schwenk, 144 Pa. 348, 22 A. 910, 912 (1891) (re-
sponsibility depends upon the knowledge and experience of the child, and
on the character of the danger to which he is exposed); and collection of
many cases relative to a variety of dangers which are usually encountered
by the child in Annot., 107 A. L. R. 1, 11-40 (1937).
42 Compare Patterson v. Palley Mfg. Co., 360 Pa. 259, 61 2d 861 (1948):
"The care and caution required of a child is measured by his capacity to
see and appreciate danger, and he is held only to such measure of such
discretion as is usual in those of his age and experience."
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as evidence.43 Others hold that the presumption acts as evi-
dence and the trial court cannot as a matter of law do anything
but send the case to the jury on the question of contributory
negligence, with the result that the child is protected from being
found contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
4 4
As the child reaches the age of fourteen and over, the courts
have rather consistently applied a presumption of capacity for
observing the same standard of care as that of an adult, which,
however, can be overcome by evidence showing that the child
had less discretion and judgment than an adult, thus entitling
him to be judged by the standard of care applicable to children.
It has been stated that the considerations relevant to over-
coming the rebuttable presumption of incapacity are substantially
similar to those considered in establishing the standard of care
to be required of a child, such as evidence as to his special
capacity, intelligence and training.45 There is, however, no
definitive principle that merely because there is sufficient evi-
dence to rebut the presumption of incapacity, the child must be
considered as having failed to meet the standard of care required
of him.
The mere fact that the child is capable of contributory neg-
ligence should not of itself defeat his right of recovery. Capacity
is concerned with the child's ability to appreciate danger and
to avoid it. The standard of care, on the other hand, is con-
cerned with his obligation to use this ability. Thus the jury
should be charged that it has a double question to decide-that
is, (1) capacity and (2) whether the child lived up to the re-
quired standard of care.46 This would probably work for the
child's benefit since it places a more onerous duty on the jury.
Since defendant usually has the burden of proof on the issue,
there are two hurdles he has to jump, thus increasing his burden.
43 Shaw v. Perfetti, 125 S. E. 2d 778 (W. Va. 1962); Grant v. Mays, 129 S. E.
2d 10 (Va. 1963).
44 Roberts v. Taylor, 339 S. W. 2d 653 (Ky. 1960). The same result was
reached in 257 N. C. 611, 127 S. E. 2d 214 (1962) which approved Wilson v.
Bright, 255 N. C. 329, 121 S. E. 2d 601, 603 (1961), where a nine year old
bicyclist tangled with defendant's automobile and the court ruled that
"non-suit on the ground of contributory negligence was not permissible."
45 Annot., 77 A. L. R. 2d 917, 927 (1961).
46 Ibid. at 927, suggesting, on the other hand, that perhaps the best ap-
proach is to submit to the jury the simple question of whether the child
has acted reasonably under all of the circumstances, including its age,
development, experience, discretion and physical and mental development.
Sept., 1963
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The Illinois Rule v. The Massachusetts Rule
The "Illinois Rule," which gives a conclusive presumption
of incapacity to children (usually up to seven years of age) has
in recent years been on the defensive. 47 The attack has been
mainly on the grounds that it enforces a rule "contrary to
fact" 48 and that it leads to the unbecoming conclusion that one
day's difference in age determines whether the child is or is not
capable of contributory negligence.49 In Hellstern v. Smelowitz5"
the court, stating that the rule rests on the "moss-covered stump
of an antiquated rule of criminal law which declined to acknowl-
edge the existence of any capacity in a child under seven years
of age to distinguish between right and wrong," reasoned that
a boy one day under seven years of age might be guilty of the
most flagrant contributory negligence and yet evidence of his
exceptional precosity and breadth of judgment and experience
could not be introduced "to overcome the illusory presumption
of baby-like puerility." 51
The above cases, which adopt the "Massachusetts Rule,"
point up the proposition that age alone should not be the de-
termining factor of capacity in cases involving children over the
age to which all courts accord the benefit of the conclusive pre-
sumption of incapacity. From the standpoint of realism, this ap-
proach seems to be based on much more solid ground. The basic
question is whether the child has the intelligence, experience,
training, discretion and alertness to appreciate and avoid the
danger.5 2
47 Note the distinction between applying a conclusive presumption of in-
capacity that under the circumstances the child is not capable of contribu-
tory negligence as a matter of law. Benning v. Schlemmer, 57 Ohio App.
457, 14 N. E. 2d 941 (1937).
48 See Dillman v. Mitchell, 13 N. J. 412, 99 A. 2d 809 (1953).
49 Dogen v. Lamb, 75 S. D. 7, 59 N. W. 2d 550 (1953).
50 17 N. J. Super. 366, 86 A. 2d 265, 270 (1952).
51 See also the terse dissent of Potter, J., in Tyler v. Weed, supra, 280 N. W.
840, stating:
The court announced a rule, supported neither by the canon law, the
civil law, the common law, or other law, which excludes intelligence and
experience in determining culpability and disregards the rule that
everyone is bound to use that degree of care which a reasonably pru-
dent person of like age, intelligence and experience should ordinarily
use under like circumstances. A rule that age, not sense; years, not in-
telligence; length of life, not experience, should govern responsibility
for human action is unsound and should be discarded.
52 McCain vs. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 110 So. 2d 718 (Fla. App.
1959). The experience of the child encompasses his previous training in
safety and also the association which he has had with older children in the
family. Hadley v. Morris, 35 Tenn. App. 534, 249 S. W. 2d 295 (1951).
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The "Illinois Rule," however, has been stoutly and with a
great deal of persuasion defended on the basis of the child's im-
pulsive nature and lack of sense perception, with needs of his
own and a mentality adapted to his needs; the avoidance of the
danger of shifting standards and the confusion and inconsistency
which often marks jury decisions; simplicity and administrative
expediency. There is a further policy reason that a negligent
defendant should not be allowed to escape on the ground that an
infant who is not fully aware of the consequences of his acts was
also negligent, since defendant was the one who placed the in-
jurious force in operation. The public has an interest in seeing
that the infant be recompensed for such loss rather than having
the entire expense borne by the public as so often happens; the
complications of modern civilization with its crowding traffic and
premium on speed has lessened the odds in favor of safety for
infants.53
The Hybrid Standard of Care
While it has been stated that there is no ideal standard by
which it can be determined whether a given child in a particular
case exercised the measure of care which the law requires there
has developed a more or less standard phraseology in defining the
standard of care required of children. The standard is usually
couched in terms of requiring the care reasonably to be ex-
pected under the same or similar circumstances from the ordi-
nary child of like age, intelligence, and experience.54 It has been
likened to the ordinary, reasonable man standard used for adults,
with the exception that "special qualifications and incapacities of
the child may be taken into consideration." 55
There is some question as to whether the so-called adult
standard is objective in the sense that it is not subject to the
same exception that qualities of the individual person involved
may be taken into consideration. 56
53 Tyler v. Weed, supra note 12; Wilderman, Contributory Negligence of
Infants, 10 Ind. L. J. 427 (1935).
54 Annot., 107 A. L. R. 1, 44 (1937); Annot., 174 A. L. R. 1080, 1083 (1948);
Annot., 77 A. L. R. 2d 917, 930 (1961); Restatement, Torts, par. 283, Com-
ment e, and para. 464.
55 Annot. 77 A. L. R. 2d 917, 930 (1961).
56 Goodman v. Norwalk Jewish Center, Inc., 145 Conn. 146, 139 A. 2d 812
(1958), taking account of the "personal equation" of plaintiff's lack of
coordination caused by prior fractures.
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In the Charbonneau case57 it is asserted that "the funda-
mental rule of reasonable conduct remains constant, but the cir-
cumstances of the age and stage of development of the individual
in the process of his growth during his minority are important
considerations in applying the rule," which was approved in
Grenier vs. Town of Glastonbury-' s (Conn.).
An instruction that children of tender years "are bound only
to use that degree of care which ordinarily prudent children of
that age and like intelligence are accustomed to use under the
circumstances," while held not error, has been criticized on the
ground that the experience of the jurors with the facts in ques-
tion (which presented a situation which was not of common ex-
perience) might differ and therefore the jurors might be con-
fused in trying to determine to what degree of care a child of
plaintiff's age was accustomed to use in such circumstances.5 9
The court stated that a more accurate test might be one which
would require the jurors to ascertain, from their own experience
with children, the care and prudence which children of that age
might reasonably be expected to exercise. The standard, thus,
would be based on what the jury would reasonably expect such a
child to exercise and not what the jury might find that the
children of like age, intelligence and experience actually exer-
cised under the circumstances in question. This test would be
an objective one which would, theoretically, not be based on the
individual experience of each juror but on what the jury de-
termined would be reasonable conduct which the public should
require of the child under the circumstances.60
Such a standard was criticized as being a "confusion of the
objective standard of care, and the individual standard of care of
a particular child" in Judge McAllister's opinion in Tyler v.
57 Supra note 17.
58 Supra note 33.
59 Neas v. Bohien, 174 Md. 696, 199 A. 852 (1938).
60 Grant vs. Mays, 129 S. E. 2d 10, 13 (Va. 1963), should be compared with
Neas vs. Bohlen, supra note 59. The Annot., 77 A. L. R. 2d 917 (1961),
seems to follow the reasoning in the latter case in saying that most courts
would agree that such a child is required to exercise, for his own safety,
the standard of care reasonably to be expected under the same or similar
circumstances, from the ordinary child of like age, intelligence and ex-
perience and that the mental operation to be performed in applying the
test is similar to that in formulating the "ordinary, reasonable man" used
as a test of adult care, with the exception that special qualifications or ca-
pacities of the child may be taken into consideration.
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Weed,0 1 in which he seems to have misinterpreted such an in-
struction as requiring the jury to find what a prudent, careful
child of the same age, intelligence, ability and understanding
"would do under the circumstances" instead of what such child
would be "expected to do." Be this as it may, it is clear that he
would not prescribe and require "novel standards of care" or
''more severe obligations of conduct than prevailed in the Middle
Ages." 62
The juror would have as much difficulty in following stand-
ard of care instructions in adult cases framed similarly to the
one in Neas vs. Bohlen. Yet the courts have not hesitated to di-
rect the jury to determine whether the adult has exercised such
care "as is usually exercised by ordinarily prudent persons in the
same or similar circumstances." 63
There would seem to be no logical difference between the
standards in this respect. The juror would be as much confused
in the case of an adult as he would be in the case of a child
in determining what the average person (adult or child) actually
does in certain factual situation rather than in what he is ex-
pected to do as a matter of community valuation.
While the standard of care applied to a child is objective in
the sense that it applies the standard of children of the same
capacity acting as ordinarily prudent children under the same
circumstances, the standard is in some respects subjective. For
example, the child owes a greater duty than the average child
of his age if he has more than the average capacity and intel-
ligence for a child of his age. He must use the capacity and in-
telligence which he has. 4 This is merely another way of saying
that the child must live up to the standard of an older child if
the child has the understanding, knowledge, etc., which an older
child would have. This measurably discounts the factor of age,
61 Supra note 11.
62 Tyler v. Weed, supra note 11 at 838.
63 Fork Ridge Busline vs. Matthews, 58 S. W. 2d 615, 617 (Ky. 1933).
64 Marius v. Motor Delivery Co., 131 N. Y. Supp. 357, 360, 146 App. Div.
608 (1911); Western and A. R. Co. v. Young, 81 Ga. 397, 7 S. E. 912 (1888);
Thomas v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 47 Utah 394, 154 P. 777 (1916). In
Turner v. City of Moberly, 224 Mo. App. 683, 26 S. W. 2d 997 (1930), the
court stated that mere knowledge that injury might result without ap-
preciation of the risk is not sufficient, but if the danger is so obvious that
an ordinarily prudent child of the same capacity for knowing and ap-
preciating the danger or risk would have known and appreciated it under
the same or similar circumstances, then the child is held to have construc-
tive knowledge and appreciation.
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which is only one factor to be considered in connection with the
experience, of the child. 5
While the courts have recognized that a child is a creature
of impulse, they have been unwilling to excuse him from his
duty of care just because his action was the result of "irresistible
impulse" (a concept more commonly encountered in the field of
criminal law).6
The standard of care applied to children purports to hold
the child to the intelligence and capacity expected of the fictional
child having the characteristics of the plaintiff. In all likelihood
the jury will in its own mind emphasize certain sympathy-pro-
ducing factors in the case, in the child's favor, even though the
fictional child is laid before them as the model to which the child-
plaintiff must conform.
Teen-Agers
If the plaintiff is a teenager of fourteen or beyond his ca-
pacity, discretion, knowledge and experience may be taken into
consideration in determining whether he exercised due care un-
less it clearly appears that he possessed these elements to the
same extent as an ordinary adult. In Lundy v. Brown 7 the
court stated that the age of adult capacity cannot be determined
with sufficient "medical accuracy," but it is universally recog-
nized that it is not reached at the age of fourteen. Until a minor
has reached the state of maturity showing him to be capable of
using the judgment of a reasonably prudent adult, his conduct
65 Annot. 107 A. L. R. 1, 40. While the elements of age and experience have
been approved as proper elements to determine the degree of care required
of a child, doubt has been expressed as to whether they should be included
in a jury instruction. Seward v. York, 124 Colo. 512, 239 P. 2d 301, 305
(1951) (the court stated that it might have been well to exclude these ele-
ments, but the inclusion of them was not prejudicial error); Charbonneau,
supra note 17 (held not error to refer to age and experience as constituting
the standard of conduct); and Cassens v. Tillberg, 294 Ill. App. 168, 13 N. E.
2d 644 (1938) (instruction including elements of age, capacity and discretion
to recognize and avoid dangers held error since it omitted element of
"experience"); Hurzon v. Schmitz, 262 Ill. App. 337 (1931).
66 Riley v. Holcomb, 187 Kan. 711, 359 P. 2d 849, 855 (1961), holding that an
instruction that "boys will not be charged with negligence when they merely
follow the irresistible impulses of their own natures, instincts common
to all boys" was properly refused even though the jury might have found
that what the child did was what a boy of like age (9), capacity, discretion,
knowledge, and experience would ordinarily do under like circumstances,
and that he was merely following his irresistible impulses, an instinct
common to all boys. See also Ackerman v. Advance Petroleum Transport,
304 Mich. 96, 7 N. W. 2d 235 (1942).
67 305 Ky. 721, 205 S. W. 2d 498 (1947).
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is not to be measured by the same standard as that of a mature
person, but by such judgment and experience as children of
similar age, experience and judgment would use under the cir-
cumstances.0
The adult standard of care has been applied where the child
has been injured while engaging in activity normally undertaken
by adults. For example, the court has frowned on youthful de-
fiance or disregard of physical laws where he is engaging in the
"adult activity" of alcoholic consumption. He is expected "to
be aware of the fact that the voluntary imbibing of the amount
of wine which he necessarily must have consumed would end in
the dire results which followed therefrom"-which is, maybe, a
way of saying that he had better know his "capacity." 09 Simi-
larly, he is expected to know certain things about an automobile
if he is going to drive one.,0 The perils of water must also be
given due respect by the child, even before he arrives in his
teens.7 1 Courts have divided on how to view the teen-ager who
violates a driving statute or ordinance. In Wilson vs. Shumate, 7 2
it was held error to instruct the jury that in considering whether
or not plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, the jury
should take into consideration her age, her intelligence and dis-
cretion, under a statute which put a duty of care on "every per-
son." Nielsen vs. Brown 73 concluded that plaintiff, a female of
nearly seventeen, "put off the things of a child" in assuming the
responsibility of driving.74 Very recently there has appeared
68 This same principle was applied to a 15-year-old in Laseter v. Clark, 54
Ga. App. 669, 189 S. E. 265 (1936), even though the child was presumptively
charged with diligence for his own safety when peril was palpable and
manifest.
69 Robinson v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York, 135 So. 2d 607, 611
(La. App. 1961).
70 Redding vs. Morris, 105 Ga. App. 152, 123 S. E. 2d 714 (1961), where the
court, affirming a directed verdict for defendant, held a teen-ager (16)
chargeable with such diligence as might be fairly expected of the class and
condition of which he belongs, noting that he "should appreciate the danger
of driving an automobile with defective brakes and a defective accelerator."
There was a smell of alcohol in this case which makes the result all the
more understandable.
71 City of Evansville v. Blue, 212 Ind. 130, 8 N. E. 2d 224 (1937), a healthy
boy of 11 is deemed to know the perils of deep water and that it is negligent
for one who is not a good swimmer to venture into deep water.
72 296 S. W. 2d 72 (Mo. 1957).
73 374 P. 2d 896, 908 (Ore. 1962).
74 For collection of numerous cases on effect of violation of statute or
ordinance see Annot., 174 A. L. R. 1170 (1948).
(Continued on next page)
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a tendency to hold minor automobile drivers to an adult standard
of care, in at least five states.7 5
Conclusion
The judge, giving due weight to the mysterious characteris-
tics of the younger child, accords to him great leeway, but the ra-
tionale for doing so is somewhat obscure. The jury, considered
competent to judge on many matters in what could well be con-
sidered the field of child psychology, is usually allowed to be the
one to say whether the child has the capacity to be, and has been,
contributorily negligent. The area of capacity contains trouble-
some problems of when to use the conclusive presumption of
incapacity and how to use rebuttable presumptions. The "child-
ish" standard of care, although rather uniformly formalized, is
a peculiar mixture of the objective and subjective, but, like the
adult standard, depends on what society expects as reasonable,
considering all the circumstances but having the child's charac-
teristics as additional factors. The teenager and the automobile
have created problems over which the courts have been unable
to arrive at a uniform approach.7 6
(Continued from preceding page)
See Simmons vs. Holm, 367 P. 2d 368 (Ore. 1961), ruling that a child,
age fourteen, was not guilty of negligence per se where he rode his bike
contrary to statute and collided with a car, but recognizing that he was
not "free from a general duty to obey the statute."
Compare: Moak vs. Black, 230 Miss. 337, 92 So. 2d 845 (1957) (Error
to instruct verdict for defendant if jury found that plaintiff bicyclist, age
nine, violated left turn statute, in absence of proof of exceptional capacity
for his age or faculty of judgment in such degree as removed him from this
class); Glassman vs. Keller, 291 Ill. App. 262, 9 N. E. 2d 289 (1937) (proper
to refuse an instruction which directed verdict for defendant if plaintiff
rode bicycle on sidewalk in violation of ordinance and if such violation
proximately contributed to his injuries).
75 Allen v. Ellis, 380 P. 2d 408 (Kans. 1963); Harrelson v. Whitehead, 365
S. W. 2d 868 (Ark. 1963); Carano v. Carano, 115 Ohio App. 33 (1961);
Dellwo v. Pearson, 107 N. W. 2d 859 (Minn. 1961); Betzold v. Erickson, 182
N. E. 2d 342 (Ill. App. 1962); all reported in Oleck, Negl. & Comp. Serv.
(Vol. 8, No. 1, Oct. 1, 1962, et seq.).
76 But see text, supra at n. 75.
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